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 4  Comparative Perspectives 
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on Youth Transitions and Opportunities 
 Andy  Green ,  Nicola  Pensiero 
 Abstract 
 This chapter aims to do two things. First, it discusses the literature on 
the different types of upper secondary education and training systems 
across OECD countries and reviews some historical evidence on the 
differential effects of these systems on youth transitions. A typology of 
upper secondary systems is developed, drawing on the traditional clas-
sifi cations by educational characteristics within comparative education 
and taking into account the contextual infl uences of different labor mar-
ket regimes and welfare systems elaborated in the comparative political 
economy literature. The effects of the different types of system on skills 
outcomes are analyzed in terms of their impacts on levels and distribu-
tions of young people’s literacy and numeracy skills, using the recent data 
from the OECD Survey of Adult Skills. The implications of these dif-
ferent skills outcomes for youth transitions are considered. Second, the 
chapter reviews the evidence on changes across countries in youth tran-
sitions since the beginning of the 2007/ 2008 fi nancial crisis – in terms 
of education participation rates, youth and graduate unemployment and 
employment rates, graduate wage premia, and rates of return to degrees – 
and considers how upper secondary education and training systems may 
have mediated these. It concludes that the upper secondary education 
training systems continue to exercise differential infl uences on youth 
transitions as before the crisis and that varying effects of the crisis on 
youth transitions across countries are most likely mainly due to different 
labor market conditions. 
  Introduction 
 We may expect that the changes that have occurred since the onset of the 
global fi nancial crisis in 2007/ 2008 will have major and lasting effects on 
young people’s lives and future opportunities. Young people have been 
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disproportionately affected by declining real incomes (Atkinson  2014 ), 
precarious employment (Standing  2011 ), 1  and rising unemployment – 
although in some countries, of course, much more than others. Some 
of these changes may be largely due to the recession and affect only 
this generation of youth, although the repercussions for them will be 
long lasting (see Ashton, this volume). Other changes, however, are more 
structural and long term. As in the case of rising youth unemployment 
rates, they predated the recession, which then exacerbated them, and 
they will be likely to affect future generation s of young people (Bell and 
Blanchfl ower  2011 ). 
 Major changes in welfare and social security arrangements, not least 
for pensions, have been precipitated by the combination of long- term 
declines in birth rate s and increases in longevity and the consequent age-
ing of populations in all the more developed countries and some less 
developed ones as well (Hills  2015 ). The problems arising from the 
growing costs of pensions and health care in aging populations are not 
new, but they have been intensifi ed by the economic crisis and the addi-
tional pressures this has placed on public fi nances and personal savings. 
They will impact on young people long into the future. 
 The same may be said of the housing crisis affecting all developed 
and most developing countries in different degrees. This predated the 
fi nancial crisis – and indeed brought on the near collapse of the banking 
system s in the USA, the UK, and other countries such as Spain (Stiglitz 
 2010 ). The shortage of housing , and continual infl ation of property and 
rental prices, affects young people particularly, so much so that we now 
talk of a “generation rent ” for whom high rents and house prices make 
getting onto the housing ladder a distant prospect. Many, perhaps the 
majority, are unlikely to own their own homes until their middle age, 
thus delaying many of the other transitions often associated with home 
ownership – such as getting married and having children – and depriv-
ing this generation of what has been one of the most powerful sources 
of social mobility for previous postwar generations in western Europe 
(Dorling  2014 ). 
 These two structural changes  – both exacerbated by the crisis  – 
alone are massively and probably permanently reshaping the opportu-
nity structures and life chances of the current and future generations 
of young people, as well as the relations between generations . To put it 
somewhat bluntly, young working people are increasingly shouldering, 
 1   According to Atkinson ( 2014 ), between  2008 and 2013, median earnings of full- time 
workers in the UK rose by 6 percent less than prices, but in the case of 22– 29- year- olds 
the shortfall was over 10 percent. 
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through their taxes and pension contributions, the growing costs of the 
welfare of older generations . While this has been true of previous genera-
tions  – since a basic principle of welfare systems is that they smooth out 
the risks over the life course (Hills  2015 ) – the current younger genera-
tion is unlikely to reap the same benefi ts when old that previous gen-
erations have done. They will work longer, retire later, and receive less 
generous pensions than their parents’ generation (Willetts  2010 ). At the 
same time, young people are increasingly subordinated to older genera-
tions , both fi nancially and politically. 
 Many young people are continuing to live in the parental home until 
their late twenties, while others who move out earlier – the so- called boo-
merang children – are often forced to return through lack of resources 
to live independently. Those that can rent are usually tenants of an older 
generation of landlords who, as Thomas Piketty ( 2014 ) warns, are fast 
becoming the bearers of a return of the “rentier capitalism” of previ-
ous eras. Those who can afford to buy homes do so at an astronomical 
price, and are, in effect, contributing to a vast transfer of wealth from 
the younger generation to older generations who own the overwhelming 
majority of the overpriced housing stock (Dorling  2014 ). Escape from 
either scenario increasingly requires an inheritance or fi nancial support 
from parents and grandparents, but this option, available only to some, 
also binds young adults in relations of dependency with their parents. 
This may be construed as a positive strengthening of intergenerational 
bonds, which might be enhanced yet further by reductions in inherit-
ance taxes in one Conservative scenario (Willetts  2010 ). Alternatively, it 
can be seen as a brake on the political expression of a generation whose 
sense of political effi cacy is already at rock bottom in the face of the 
overwhelming dominance of the “gray” vote. The reshaping of relations 
between generations goes beyond intergenerational transfers. It is also a 
reconfi guration of cultural politics. Compare the relative constraint of 
the current young generation with the power to shape cultural and politi-
cal movements enjoyed by the baby boomer generation that came of age 
in the 1960s. 
 Piketty’s analysis of the deep structural trends in modern capitalism 
goes much further than this and, if he is right, suggests yet more far- 
reaching changes in opportunity structures and life chances for future 
generations of youth. In his analysis of the long- term evolution of capital-
ism , Piketty shows that with the post- 1970s slowing of growth in popu-
lations and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), returns to capital greatly 
exceed growth in national output, thus raising the ratio of private wealth 
to national income. As private wealth is more unequally distributed than 
incomes, its relative growth yields dividends that multiply the effects 
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of the already rising inequality in earnings resulting from weaker trade 
unions , skills- biased technological change, globalization, and stronger 
corporate elites. As the ratio of private wealth to national income grows 
to levels last seen in the Edwardian era in the UK, increasing shares 
of wealth are inherited rather than earned – already typically over 70 
percent in western Europe . This will further reduce social mobility for 
future generations of young people (Piketty  2014 ). 
 The Great Recession is a product of all these structural tendencies and 
indeed accelerates the labor market changes that arise from them, prob-
ably permanently reshaping the patterns of opportunities and life course 
transitions for young people. However, at the same time these forces 
are subject to political intervention and change. As Piketty shows, the 
substantial reduction in inequalities of wealth and incomes experienced 
in the years between 1914 and 1970 – now reversed – was not just the 
result of the considerable physical destruction of private wealth during 
the two world wars , although that may have been a major factor. It was 
also substantially affected by political decisions to increase public own-
ership and public spending, which reduced the share of private wealth 
in the economy , and also by policies on the taxation of wealth , incomes 
and inheritances, and on minimum wages , explicitly designed to reduce 
inequality in earnings and household incomes. Political choices will be 
no less important in the future. The choices made by nation- states – and 
to some extent by global institutions – will affect the course of these deep 
structural changes, just as they have affected the impact of the Great 
Recession in different countries (Green, Mostafa, and Preston  2010 ). 
 Political choices shape institutional change, and the nature of the 
institutions in different countries mediates the effects of global historical 
forces on their societies (Soskice  2014 ). We therefore need to under-
stand these institutions, and how they vary internationally, to understand 
the different life course patterns of young people in different places. 
Education and training systems represent one such institution. 
  The Effects of Upper Secondary Education and Training 
Systems on Skills Outcomes and Youth Transitions 
 Previous comparative work on upper secondary education (and training) 
and youth transition s has tended to contrast the situation in countries 
with “dual systems” of apprenticeship (Ashton, this volume) with that in 
English- speaking countries, which lack such well- embedded systems of 
apprenticeship, and with other European national systems, such as in the 
Nordic countries, that rely on comprehensive upper secondary educa-
tion and training systems , coupled with work experience. 
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 A series of Anglo- German comparative studies (e.g., Bynner and 
Roberts  1991 ; Evans and Heinz  1994 ; Kerckhoff  2001 ) have suggested 
that apprenticeship systems provide smoother transition s into work 
for young people, with more certainty about entry into employment in 
skilled and relatively well- paid occupations. The rather mixed and diver-
sifi ed system in England, by contrast, has been associated with less clearly 
defi ned transition pathways, which can be both circuitous and frequently 
disrupted. Other work on the effects of apprenticeship systems (Brown, 
Kirpal, and Rauner  2007 ) focuses on the role of long cycle apprentice-
ships in professional socialization and therefore in the formation of adult 
identities among young people. By contrast again, English- speaking 
countries have largely replaced the traditional long apprenticeship, with 
its emphasis on the gradual acquisition of occupation skills, identities, 
and work values, with various forms of competence- led training, largely 
bereft of this socializing element. They have been seen as providing a 
comparatively weak basis for young people’s employability and their 
adult identity formation (Brown, Kirpal, and Rauner  2007 ). 
 Other research has made wider claims for the effects of apprentice-
ship systems. Research in the comparative political economy tradition, 
for instance, has frequently argued that dual systems of apprenticeship 
not only provide smoother transitions into employment and lower rates 
of youth unemployment (Allmendinger  1989 ; Breen  2005 ; Gangl  2003 ), 
but also contribute toward the reduction of skills inequalities. Countries 
with such systems are generally observed to retain a higher proportion 
of adults with intermediate skills and thus to reduce the hollowing- out 
of skills stocks and consequent skills polarization associated with more 
liberal economies and other types of education and training system 
(Estevez- Abe, Iverson, and Soskice  2001 ; Brown, Green, and Lauder 
 2001 ). Going further still, others have argued that, when combined with 
certain forms of labor market organization, and particularly central-
ized systems of wage bargaining, apprenticeship systems promote wage 
equalization (Busemeyer and Iversen  2012 ; Busemeyer  2014 ) among 
adult workers. 
 In what follows we look at how far these claims about differential sys-
tem effects on young people’s educational outcomes and employment 
transitions are substantiated by the evidence on skills and employ-
ment from the OECD Survey of Adult Skills (OECD  2013c ). 2  The 
survey tested adult skills in literacy, numeracy, and problems solving, 
but we confi ne ourselves here to the results for literacy and numeracy. 
 2   This is also sometimes known as PIAAC for “Programme for International Adult 
Assessment of Competences.” 
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316779507.005
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UCL, Institute of Education, on 21 Mar 2019 at 12:10:07, subject to the Cambridge Core
Andy Green, Nicola Pensiero80
80
Literacy and numeracy, of course, constitute only one part – although 
arguably a very important part – of the set of knowledge, competence, 
and attitudinal outcomes that shape young people’s future employ-
ment transitions. However, using cross- country data on education 
achievement (skills) as opposed to educational attainment (qualifi -
cations) has one very important advantage in terms of comparative 
analysis. Educational qualifi cations cannot easily be compared across 
countries or over time. International standardization of education 
levels (as in the ISCED levels 3  ) is highly tendentious and subject to 
manipulation by the country authorities that attribute qualifi cations 
to levels. Comparisons within countries of trends in qualifi cation lev-
els are equally dubious since the content and mode of assessment in 
examinations change signifi cantly over time. By contrast, international 
skills assessment is designed to be comparable across countries and 
over time. Not surprisingly, the aggregate results of skills tests pro-
vide a much better predictor of cross- country variations in economic 
outcomes at the macro level than do alternative measures of educa-
tional attainment, such as years of schooling or qualifi cation levels (see 
Hanushek and Woessmann  2010 ). 
  A Typology of Upper Secondary Education 
and Training Systems 
 We can identify four broad types of upper secondary education and train-
ing systems in OECD countries from the comparative education and 
training literature that classifi es systems according to institutional struc-
tures, forms of curriculum and assessment, and modes of governance 
and regulation (Busemeyer and Iversen  2012 ; CEDEFOP  2008 ; Dumas, 
Mehaut, and Olympio  2013 ; Green  2003 ; Greinert  2004 ; Lasonen and 
Young  1998 ; Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre  1986 ; McLean  1990 ; OECD 
 1985 ; Raffe et al.  2001 ; Verdier  2013 ). 
 The country groups emerging from this bear a close resemblance to 
the classifi cations of economies and welfare systems in the compara-
tive political economy literature, with liberal Anglophone countries rep-
resenting one type, the social market and social democratic countries 
representing two further types, and southern Europe and East Asia , in 
some of the literature at least, being accredited with separate though less 
distinctive political economy models (see Esping- Andersen  1990 ; Green. 
Mostafa, and Preston  2010 ; Hall and Soskice  2001 ; Pontusson  2008 ). 
 3   ISCED stands for “The International Standard Classifi cation of Education” developed 
by UNESCO and OECD. 
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The connections between the two forms of classifi cation analyzed in the 
more recent literature should not be surprising, since education systems 
form an integral part of welfare systems in general, and since their func-
tioning is substantially affected by the way the external contexts, such as 
labor market and welfare institutions, interact with them (see Busemeyer 
 2014 ; Green and Janmaat  2011 ). 4  
  Type 1 Systems 
 These are predominantly school- based systems with general academic 
and vocational provision in different types of dedicated upper secondary 
institution and with apprenticeships representing separate but residual 
systems. This is the modal type in southern European countries and 
other western countries infl uenced historically by the French education 
system and also, through more complex genealogies, in central and east-
ern European (CEE) and East Asia n countries (Green  2013 ). Programs 
in upper secondary institutions normally last for two or – more usually – 
three years from the age of fi fteen, as in the original model of the modern 
French  lycée , and end with a qualifi cation which gives access to general 
university higher education (ISCED 5A) in the case of general education 
students, and vocational tertiary education (at ISCED Level 4 or 5B) 
for vocational students. The curricula in different general and vocational 
programs today generally share certain common core elements, but pro-
grams are typically organized around a cluster of subjects specifi c to the 
disciplinary or vocational orientation of program. Diplomas are normally 
based on externally administered “grouped examinations” that require 
passes in a range of subjects, including core areas of language and Math. 
The majority of continental European and East Asia n OECD coun-
tries have systems of this type (e.g., in our sample – the Czech Republic, 
Denmark , Estonia, France , Finland, Greece , Italy , Netherlands, Japan , 
Poland, and Russia). 5  
 4   The main difference between the two classifi cation systems is that France tends to be 
classifi ed with the southern European model in the education typologies, whereas it is 
normally grouped with northwestern European countries in the comparative political 
economy literature. The advantage of considering the classifi cation systems from the 
comparative education literature in addition to those from the comparative political 
economy literature is that it provides more fi ne- grained distinctions between the differ-
ent types of school- based system, and the effects of their different pedagogic approaches, 
whereas the latter tends to focus primarily on a single contrast between apprenticeship 
systems and school- based systems and the effects of the contrasting forms of linkage 
between skills formation and labor market systems in the two cases. 
 5   Denmark could be considered a borderline case because up to 30 percent of young peo-
ple take a form of apprenticeship , but many of the apprentices are not on traditional 
apprentice contracts as in dual system apprenticeship s. 
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  Type 2 Systems 
 These are predominantly comprehensive, school- based systems with 
academic and vocational provision within the same institution and with, 
again, apprenticeships representing a largely residual alternative form. 
Provision is organized either as a standardized, core plus options program, 
as in most North American high schools, or in differentiated programs 
with distinctive subject specialisms but overlapping cores of general edu-
cation, as in Norway or Sweden. These systems share most of the charac-
teristics of Type 1 systems, but tend to have a higher degree of integration 
of curricula and assessment across the range of provision (Raffe et al. 
 2001 ). They can be regarded generally as relatively standardized on one 
level – since there is only one main type of upper secondary institution. 
However, governance and regulation varies considerably between the US 
and Scandinavian contexts, with school choice and diversity policies in 
the former leading to much greater institutional variation than would be 
found in the more standardized Nordic systems. A number of countries 
have a few such institutions ( eniaia lykeio in Greece ;  lycées polyvalents in 
France; and tertiary colleges in England) but only four OECD countries 
have this type of institution as the dominant institutional form (Canada , 
Norway, Sweden, and the USA). Because of differences in governance 
and regulation, Type 2 systems are best divided between Type 2a for the 
North American variant and Type 2b for the Nordic Variant. 
  Type 3 Systems 
 These are systems with participation distributed relatively equally 
between school- based general education and employment- based dual 
systems of apprenticeship and are found exclusively in social market pol-
itical economies. In this kind of system the provision at upper secondary 
level may be of similar duration across the different tracks (as with the 
normatively three- year apprenticeships and fi nal stage  Abitur courses in 
Germany), and the vocational track may contain signifi cant mandatory 
components of general education [as in all dual system apprenticeships 
(Solga et al.  2014 )]. However, the general and vocational tracks remain 
very distinctive, with sharp differences in forms of regulation, curric-
ula, and assessment, and with clearly differentiated fi nal qualifi cations 
and subsequent progression possibilities in education, training, and work 
(e.g., in Germany, university for  Abitur graduates from the  Gymnasium 
and  Realschule and skilled jobs or higher technical courses for apprentice 
graduates). In respect of their dual systems, Type 3 systems have distinct-
ive forms of regulation based on social partner organizations. This means 
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that apprenticeship systems are closely integrated with labor market 
institutions and the world of work, and this has important effects on 
the labor market value of the qualifi cations they offer and the conse-
quent incentives this provides for apprentices (Busemeyer and Iversen 
 2012 ). A number of countries have traditional dual systems of appren-
ticeship , where provision is regulated by the social partners, and with 
apprentices recruited by fi rms and placed on employment contracts 
(including Austria , Belgium , Denmark , Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, and Switzerland). But it is only in Austria, Germany, and 
Switzerland where a third or more of young people participate in them 
(OECD  2008 , 331, table C1.1; Steedman  2001 ,  2010 ). In the varieties 
of capitalism literature these three countries present the core cases of the 
social market model of political economy . 
  Type 4 Systems 
 These are “mixed systems” that include many different school- and 
employment- based programs of variable length and quality but with 
dominant academic tracks. Programs in these systems are often organ-
ized on a modular basis, to promote fl exible combinations of options. 
Assessment in general subjects can be through elective single subject 
awards (as with the English A levels) or, in some cases, by grouped 
awards that specify a given combination of subjects to be assessed, as 
in  Bachillerato in Spain . Vocational courses are often competence- based 
and students are assessed on the basis of their ability to demonstrate 
competences rather than on their knowledge of a syllabus, and pro-
grams often do not have a prescribed duration. Regulation and govern-
ance in mixed systems is generally more liberal and market- oriented 
than in other systems, with much diversity in programs and types of 
providers, including private training organizations and, in the case of 
the UK, private awarding bodies. Systems in this group tend to have 
lower participation rates among 17- and 18- year- olds and relatively high 
rates of early school leaving [defi ned by the European Commission as 
those who leave education without qualifi cations above the ISCED 3 C 
(short) level]. 6  Systems broadly conforming to this type can be found 
in Australia, England, Northern Ireland, Ireland, Scotland, Spain, and 
New Zealand. With the exception of Spain , these countries all belong 
to the liberal model of political economy identifi ed in the varieties of 
capitalism literature. 
 6   See Eurostat data at:   http:// epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ statistics_ explained/ index.php/ 
School_ enrolment_ and_ early_ leavers_ from_ education_ and_ training 
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 To what extent are the different system types associated with different 
aggregate outcomes in terms of levels and distributions of skills? To date 
there has been very little literature that examines the contribution of 
upper secondary education and training systems to skills gain (see Green 
and Pensiero  2015a ). A  more extensive literature exists, however, on 
effects of system types on skills inequality. Much of this relates to the 
question of tracking and the paradoxical way in which this intersects with 
the relative parity of esteem between academic and vocational education 
in different types of system. 
 All upper secondary systems involve some kind of hierarchical differ-
entiation between general academic courses and vocational programs, 
even where these take place in the same institution (Van Houtte and 
Demanet  2012 ). However, arguably, the key difference between the four 
types lies in the size of the status and quality gap existing between the 
academic and vocational tracks. In Type 3 systems, including general 
academic institutions and dual system apprenticeship s, vocational pro-
vision is generally considered to be of high quality and the programs 
attract a large number of students (sometimes a majority of the age 
group), coming from across the ability range, including a substantial 
proportion graduating from the academic  Gymnasium or even university 
(Schneider and Tieben  2011 ). These higher achieving entrants add to 
the prestige of the vocational system, the quality of its outputs, and the 
value of its qualifi cations on the labor market, the latter being boosted 
in addition by strong labor market demand for intermediate skills (Hall 
and Soskice  2001 ). With such apprenticeship systems, it is argued (Raffe 
et al.  2001 ), there will be greater parity of esteem between the academic 
and vocational tracks, and consequently expectations and achievement 
in the vocational tracks will be higher. This may help to reduce inequality 
in skills outcomes. 
 In Type 1 and Type 2 systems there are typically also status differences 
between academic and vocational tracks (which can be greater than in 
Type 3 systems) and this is particularly the case where the vocational 
tracks do not give full access to higher education , as is typical in Type 1 
systems. The higher achieving students are likely to enroll in academic 
tracks, with vocational tracks taking a higher proportion of lower achiev-
ing students, who cannot access the general tracks. However, the status 
gap between the tracks is partially mitigated by a common structure to 
programs, particularly in Type 2 systems, so that they all last three or 
more years and require a given amount of time learning in core general 
education subjects, such as the national language and Math (Hodgen 
et  al.  2010 ). As in the apprenticeship systems, this may serve to raise 
the literacy and numeracy skills of the lower achievers, thus reducing 
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skills gaps. In the Nordic version of comprehensive, school- based upper 
secondary education and training, there is much less between- school 
variation than in the North American system and this is also likely to 
reduce the degree to which these schools reproduce skills inequalities. 
 In more mixed systems, however, the inequality- mitigating features of 
Types 1, 2, and 3 systems, with their mandatory core curricula and long 
cycle programs, are usually absent. Participation is heavily skewed toward 
the general academic tracks that are considered to be of much higher sta-
tus. Vocational programs are variable in quality, often short in duration, 
and do not necessarily offer progression routes into higher- level pro-
grams or high quality jobs. Wage returns to vocational qualifi cation on 
the labor market tend to be relatively low (see for the UK: Greenwood, 
Jenkins, and Vignoles  2007 ). Where, as in the UK, there remains consid-
erable labor market demand for low skills recruits, participants on these 
programs may have little incentive to raise their skills levels (Keep and 
Mayhew  2014 ). Furthermore, vocational programs are typically compe-
tence- based, largely oriented toward immediate labor market entry, and 
frequently involve very little general education or continuing study of 
Math and language. A Nuffi eld Foundation survey of twenty- four coun-
tries and country regions found that none of the Anglophone countries 
and country regions, excepting the USA and Canada (British Columbia, 
BC), mandated the study of both English and Math in all upper second-
ary programs, whereas almost all the other countries (barring France , 
the Netherlands, and Singapore) required the study of both Math and 
the national language on all programs (Hodgen et al.  2010 ). Lower sta-
tus vocational tracks often fail to attract students in suffi cient numbers 
to include a broad cross- section of young people with different levels of 
attainment and this, combined with the lack of transparency that comes 
with system complexity, may mean achievement norms are weakened. 
These systems are not expected to reduce skills inequalities. 
  Skills Outcomes of Different Systems 
 The analysis that follows uses the data on literacy and numeracy skills 
from the OECD’s Survey of Adult Skills (SAS). The survey is based on 
nationally representative samples derived from standardized stratifi ed 
sampling, with minimum sample sizes of 5,000 (or 4,500 achieved sam-
ple), and was conducted in households through interviewer- supervised, 
computer- based tests of skills of adults aged 16 to 64 in twenty- fi ve 
countries and country regions in 2011/ 2012 (OECD  2013c ). The tests 
used a battery of questions of different levels of complexity and scores 
were computed based on the principles of item response theory in 
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order to take into account both the number of correct answers and the 
diffi culty of the items. The survey provides the most up- to- date com-
parative information we have about the literacy and numeracy skills of 
young people in different OECD countries. 
  Levels of Skill 
 What do the data tell us about the average levels of literacy and numeracy 
skills of young people in different countries?  Figures 4.1 and  4.2 show 
the mean skills levels in numeracy and literacy in different countries for 
young people aged 16– 24 and 55– 65. The fi rst thing to note is that the 
average skills level of young people in the Anglophone countries is low 
relative to that in most other countries in both numeracy and literacy . 
The USA ranks last (22nd) in numeracy, with England (19th), Ireland 
(18th), Northern Ireland (16th), and Canada (15th) not performing 
much better. In literacy , relative performance is only slightly better, with 
England third from the bottom, in 21st place, and the other English- 
speaking countries ranked 20th (Ireland), 19th (Northern Ireland), 18th 
(USA), and 13th (Canada ). Most remarkably, England and the USA are 
the only countries where the younger age group performs scarcely better 
on average than the older, 55– 65 age group. Young people in countries 
with dual systems of apprenticeship perform somewhat better on aver-
age than those in the Anglophone countries . Both Austria and Germany 
are in the top half of the country rankings in both literacy and numeracy. 
However, they are still some way behind the best performing countries 
and country regions, which are Finland, Flanders, Japan, and Korea. 
 How signifi cant are these differences across countries? The range of 
scores in SAS is considerable with, for instance, 36 points separating the 
mean scores for numeracy among 16– 24-year-olds in Finland and the 
Netherlands, at the top, and in the USA, at the bottom – a difference, 
according to the OECD, associated, on average across the OECD, with 
fi ve years of schooling (OECD  2013c , 63). As the OECD analysis of the 
data shows (OECD  2013c , 84), there is considerable overlap between 
country scores, so that the means for many countries will not be signifi -
cantly different from those for, say, four or fi ve other countries, close by in 
the rankings. Nevertheless OECD can separate out three groups of coun-
tries whose scores are not signifi cantly different from the OECD mean, or 
which are signifi cantly higher or lower than the mean (OECD  2013c , 82, 
 fi gure 2.7a). East Asia n countries (Japan and Korea) and social market 
countries (Austria , Belgian Flanders, Germany, and Netherlands) all fall 
in the top scoring band, along with two of the Nordic countries (Finland 
and Sweden) – with Denmark and Norway in the middle band. All of 
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the Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, France , Italy, and Spain ) and 
four of the Anglophone countries (England, Ireland, Northern Ireland, 
and the USA) fall into the bottom band – with Canada and Australia in 
the latter case in the middle band. This pattern of variation by country 
groups associated with the different varieties of capitalism and related 
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 Figure 4.1.  Numeracy means by age group, 16– 24 and 55– 65. 
 Source : OECD ( 2013c ) Skills Outlook 2013: First Results from the Survey 
of Adult Skill. Paris: OECD. 
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 Figure 4.2.  Literacy means by age group, 16– 24 and 55– 65. 
 Source : OECD ( 2013c ) Skills Outlook 2013: First Results from the Survey 
of Adult Skill. Paris: OECD 
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upper secondary system types is remarkably consistent across different 
measures in SAS. 
 If we dig deeper into the distribution we can understand more about 
why the averages differ across countries. Anglophone and southern 
European countries tend to have a larger proportion of people scoring 
at the lowest levels than other groups of countries. This is the familiar 
“long- tail of under- achievers” often discussed in relation to the UK skills 
distribution. At the same time, the proportions scoring at the highest lev-
els are well below average in the southern European countries and only 
just above the average in English- speaking countries. OECD ( 2014 ) pro-
vide the proportions of 25– 34- year- olds in each country sample scoring 
at below level 2 and at levels 4 and above for both literacy and numer-
acy (Education at a Glance, Indicator A1.8). Taking the average of the 
values for the countries in each country group, we can see that about 
one- fi fth of young people are scoring at the lowest level in numeracy 
in southern European (21 percent) and Anglophone countries (20 per-
cent), compared with 13 percent in CEE countries, 11 percent in the 
German- speaking countries, 11 percent in the Nordic countries, and 
7 percent in the East Asia n countries. In literacy, southern European 
countries, on average, also exhibit a relatively high proportion scoring at 
the lowest level (18 percent) whereas Anglophones do somewhat better 
in relative terms (13 percent). However, both groups of countries still 
stand out as having on average higher proportions of low achievers rela-
tive to other country groups, including German- speaking countries (11 
percent), Nordic and CEE countries (both 10 percent), and East Asia n 
countries (3 percent). 
  Skills Distributions 
 The distributions of literacy and numeracy skills, this time for 25– 29- 
year- olds, also reveal substantial differences between countries and coun-
try groups.  Figure 4.3 shows the difference between the mean scores of 
the bottom and top quintiles for literacy and numeracy . In both literacy 
and numeracy skills the English- speaking countries tend to have rather 
wide distributions relative to most other countries, with England, the 
USA, and Ireland being among the six most unequal countries. The East 
Asia n countries, by contrast, have narrow distributions relative to other 
countries. Austria and Germany are in the more equal half of the range of 
countries. Our signifi cance tests show that numeracy scores in England, 
Sweden, and the USA are not statistically different from each other, but 
the skills in these countries are signifi cantly more unequal than in all 
the rest. In literacy , there is no signifi cant difference between England, 
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Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the USA at the top end, 
so we can say with confi dence that three of the English- speaking coun-
tries in this group are among the fi ve countries most unequal in skills. 
Only Northern Ireland, among the English- speaking countries, occupies 
a more middling position in terms of inequality of skills. 
 SAS also contains data on the educational levels of parents of respond-
ents, so we are able to calculate a social gradient of skills measure showing 
the effects of social background on skills acquisition.  Figure 4.4 shows 
the average gap in numeracy skills in each country for 16– 24- year- olds 
and 55– 65- year- olds between those with a graduate parent and those 
with no parent having more than lower secondary education. Among 
the younger age group the social gap in achievement is relatively high in 
English- speaking countries, and particularly so in England and the USA, 
relative to that in other country groups. The country group patterns in 
general are somewhat similar to those for skills distributions, except in 
the case of southern European countries, which tend to have relatively 
wide skills distributions but relatively shallow social gradients for skills 
(a combination that is probably the product of high regional disparities 
and combined with relatively low social disparities). CEE countries, social 
market countries, and Nordic countries fall in the middle of the ranking 
on this measure of inequality of skills opportunity, whereas the East Asia n 
countries display smaller social origins effects than all other countries. 
The social gradients tend to be considerably steeper for the younger age 
group than the older one, except in a few countries (e.g., Ireland, Finland, 
and Francophone Canada ). 
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 Figure 4.3.  Differences between means for top and bottom quintiles in 
numeracy and literacy scores. 
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 The skills inequalities illustrated afore refl ect an accumulation of skills 
inequalities over the life course and cannot be attributed to upper sec-
ondary education and training systems alone. However, our recent ana-
lysis using a pseudo cohort derived from 15- year- olds in PISA 2000 and 
the 25– 29- year- olds in SAS in 2011/ 2012 suggests that countries with 
Type 3 school- based general education and extensive dual systems of 
apprenticeship , and countries with integrated school- based upper sec-
ondary systems, both tend to be better at mitigating skills inequalities 
during the upper secondary phase than countries with Type 4 “Mixed 
Systems” (Green and Pensiero  2015b ). They also tend to be better at 
maintaining or improving average levels of skill during this phase, relative 
to other countries (see Green and Pensiero  2015a ). The system charac-
teristics found to be associated with these outcomes were: high rates of 
completion of full upper secondary education (ISCED 3 A and B long 
cycle); mandatory learning of Math and the national language on all 
upper secondary programs; and relatively high parity of esteem between 
academic and vocational tracks (measured by the prevalence of voca-
tional enrollment in upper secondary education, and the social mix of 
participants on these programs). Nordic countries and countries with 
dual systems of apprenticeship rank relatively high on all these measures, 
whereas countries with mixed systems rank relatively low. 
 How might these different skills outcomes across countries affect youth 
transitions to employment? We cannot seek to trace the effects in detail 
here, but certain points can be made that provide support for dominant 
existing comparative theories of youth transitions and that suggest some of 
the mechanisms by which the different types of systems have differential 
effects on transitions. Most obviously, we can see that countries with dual 
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 Figure 4.4.  Social gradients for numeracy for younger and older age 
groups. 
 Source : Own calculations derived from data in OECD ( 2013c ) Skills 
Outlook 2013: First Results from the Survey of Adult Skill. Paris: OECD 
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systems of apprenticeship are well placed to provide smooth transition s to 
work for the majority of their young people, not only because of the early 
integration of young people into work roles provided by the apprentice-
ship system, but also because they are relatively effective in raising the 
mean level of literacy and numeracy skills and in ensuring a minimum 
of young people entering the labor market with very low levels of basic 
skills. Systems in East Asia and in the Nordic countries with comprehen-
sive upper secondary systems lack the early integration of learning and 
work that is integral to the apprenticeship systems, but they still provide 
advantages for smooth transitions to work for the majority of young peo-
ple, through achieving high average literacy and numeracy levels among 
youth and again ensuring that only a very small proportion of young peo-
ple are disadvantaged in employment opportunities by very low levels of 
basic skills. Liberal Anglophone countries , and particularly the UK and 
the USA, on the other hand, turn out generations of young people with 
highly polarized skill sets, refl ecting skills demand in the economies to 
some extent (Brown et al.  2001 ), but resulting in very unequal opportuni-
ties for more and less skilled young people in terms of employment . 
  How Have the Different Upper Secondary Systems 
Affected Youth Transitions during the Great Recession ? 
 Given that SAS is a single cross- section from 2011/ 2012 it cannot tell 
us how levels and distributions of numeracy and literacy skills have 
changed in the six years after the onset of the fi nancial crisis. However, 
we can use other time-series data (from OECD Education at a Glance 
and Eurostats) to assess changes over time in participation rates, youth 
unemployment levels, and returns to degrees, which all have a bearing 
on youth transition s. 
 As in many previous recessions, young people have tended to stay 
in education and training longer, rather than attempt early transitions 
into a depressed labor market. As the Eurostat data show (Eurostats 
 2014 ), between 2009 and 2011 there was a diminishing proportion 
of early school leavers (defi ned as those leaving with no qualifi cation 
above ISCED 3 C short) in most EU countries. A  number of coun-
tries in central and eastern Europe experienced modest increases in early 
school leaving (Croatia, Czech Republic , Hungary , Poland, Romania, 
and Slovakia), but in western Europe all countries experienced declines, 
except Belgium and Sweden. 7  
 7   See Eurostat data at:   http:// epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ statistics_ explained/ index.php/ 
School_ enrolment_ and_ early_ leavers_ from_ education_ and_ training 
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 Participation rates in higher education have also held up in most coun-
tries, despite the rises in tuition costs in some of these. Between 2007 and 
2012, entry rates to Tertiary 5A programs increased on average across 
the OECD, and in all countries except Greece , Hungary , Portugal, and 
Sweden, which showed small declines (OECD  2014 , Indicator 3C.2a). 
Entry to Type 5B programs also remained stable in most countries. 
However, the OECD note (OECD  2014 , 331) that data for 2013 show a 
decline which they attribute to a delayed response to the fi nancial crisis. 
 Upper secondary and tertiary education and training systems have 
generally not changed very substantially in their basic design in the few 
years since the onset of the fi nancial crisis, with the exception of some 
special programs introduced for those most at risk in some countries 
(see  Chapter 1 for Germany). What has changed most is the relation-
ship between qualifi cations gained and employment opportunities i.e., 
the nature of the transitions to work. As we know, unemployment rates 
among young people have risen disproportionately to those in the adult 
population in many countries. Overall unemployment of young people 
aged 15– 24 has tended to rise in most countries, but much faster in 
some countries than others. OECD youth unemployment rate data 
(OECD  2013d ) show the change in youth unemployment rates by coun-
try between 2007 and 2012. The East Asia n and social market countries 
(here Austria , Germany, Belgium , and Luxembourg) have fared best with 
no change in youth unemployment levels on average for the countries in 
each group. Nordic countries have seen only small increases. Southern 
Europe has, of course, experienced the most dramatic increases in youth 
unemployment , with rates rising on average by 21 percentage points. The 
liberal English- speaking countries and the central and eastern European 
countries lie somewhere between the extremes with rises in unemploy-
ment rates of 8 and 13 percentage points respectively. 
 Employment rates for graduates have been declining in most OECD 
countries since 2008 except in Germany, Luxembourg, Korea, and Japan 
(OECD  2013 , table A5.3a). Looking at the averages for countries in dif-
ferent country groups ( Figure 4.5 ) there is a slight increase in employ-
ment rates of graduates in the social market countries (Austria , Belgium , 
Germany, and Luxembourg) and in the East Asia n countries (Korea and 
Japan ), but a substantial decline in other country groups, with the larg-
est decline in southern European countries. Graduate underemployment 
and overqualifi cation also appear to be on the rise in some countries 
(Green and Zhu  2010 ), although we do not have data to measure this for 
a wide range of countries. A recent analysis from the Chartered Institute 
of Personnel and Development (CIPD  2015 ), based on European Social 
Survey data, suggests that between 2004 and 2010 58.8 percent of UK 
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graduates were not in jobs that respondents considered required a degree 
to enter – the third highest rate after Greece and Estonia for all the coun-
tries in the survey. However, this estimate will be higher than estimates 
that use a more encompassing defi nition of what constitutes a “graduate 
job” (based on the skills required to do the job). 
 It is hard to fi nd data on what has happened to the graduate wage 
premium for young people across countries in the period since the 
onset of the recession. OECD provide data for different age cohorts for 
2011 (OECD  2013a , table A6.1) which show that in all country groups 
except the Nordic group, older, 55– 64- year- old male and female gradu-
ates enjoyed larger wage premia for degrees than their 25– 34- year- old 
counterparts, but this may refl ect the fact that they have had longer in 
the labor market to maximize the benefi ts of their degrees, rather than 
any decline over time in the graduate wage premium. But whatever the 
overtime trend in the wage premium, it is clear from the OECD’s pub-
lished data that there remained a substantial advantage in earnings for 
graduates compared with nongraduates by 2011, albeit that this may 
be due to the fact that earnings of nongraduates are declining as fast or 
faster than earning of graduates during this period. OECD estimates 
for 2011 (OECD  2013a , table A6.1) show that tertiary educated adults 
across the OECD countries earn 1.5 times more than those with educa-
tion only to upper secondary level. This wage premium applies to both 
tertiary Type A and tertiary Type B graduates. Men in OECD countries 
with Type B tertiary education earn on average 26 percent more than 
those with only upper secondary education and women 32 percent more. 
For most countries in the OECD these wage returns to tertiary gradu-
ates held up during the 2000s, but in a few countries, including in the 
UK, the USA, Sweden, and New Zealand, there were small declines 
between 2005 and 2012 (OECD  2014 , table A6.2a). Graduate wage 
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 Figure 4.5.  Changes in employment rates of 25– 34- year- olds with ter-
tiary qualifi cations between 2008 and 2011. 
 Source : OECD ( 2013 ) Education at a Glance: Table A5.3a. Employment 
rates, by educational attainment and age group (2000, 2005, 2008, and 
2011). 
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differentials for 25– 34- year- olds, while positive in all country groups, are 
substantially higher in social democratic and eastern European coun-
tries, than in liberal, East Asian, and social market countries. 
 The trends in the rates of return to degrees show a more mixed picture. 
OECD data covering the short period from the start of the fi nancial crisis 
in 2007 until 2009 show increases in the rates of return for male gradu-
ates in eastern European, East Asia n, and social democratic states, as 
well as in the small northwest continental European states, but declines 
in the liberal and Mediterranean states. 8  For female graduates there were 
increases in eastern European and East Asia n states, but declines in the 
liberal, social market, social democratic, and Mediterranean states, as 
well as in the small northwest European states (Green, Liu, and Pensiero 
 2014 ). 
 How far have different upper secondary education and training sys-
tems protected young people against the effects of declining job oppor-
tunities since the fi nancial crisis? We cannot answer this question with 
any certainty, since most of the divergence between countries in youth 
unemployment rates since the fi nancial crisis will be due to the differ-
ences in labor market conditions. However, there is some evidence that 
dual systems of apprenticeship continue to be associated with lower levels 
of youth unemployment, as they have in the past. As  Chapter 1 argued, 
this has remained the case in Germany, despite the gradual decline in the 
number participating in traditional dual system apprenticeships, partly 
because of the introduction of a new “transition system” that provides 
shelter from unemployment for the growing number of less qualifi ed 
young people who are now not able to directly access an employment- 
based apprenticeship . 
 Figure 4.6 uses data from SAS, conducted in 2011/ 2012, and shows 
the relationship between youth employment rates for 20– 24- year- olds 
and the proportion of young employees aged 16– 25 who are on appren-
ticeship or trainee contracts . The two are positively and signifi cantly 
related ( r  = 0.29,  p  < 0.2). This association supports previous fi ndings 
that good quality apprenticeship systems do tend to promote higher 
rates of employment among young people and suggests that this rela-
tionship still held up during the recession. However, it is clearly only in 
the three countries with a large proportion of young people in appren-
ticeships (Denmark , Austria, and Germany) where this effect occurs. For 
the majority of countries with only a small proportion of young people 
 8   Source : For 2009, data are obtained from  Education at a Glance (OECD  2013a ) Table 
A7.3a for male and Table A7.3b for female. For 2007, data are from  Education at a Glance 
(OECD  2011 ) table A9.3. For 2003, data are from Education at a Glance (OECD  2006 ) 
table A9.5. 
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in apprenticeships there appears to be no association with employment 
rates. 
 In terms of the effects of different types of upper secondary provision 
on skills inequality and consequent wage inequality, we have currently 
too few data to make any assessment. The reductions in early school leav-
ing that we saw earlier may be having some effect in reducing inequality 
in skills outcomes in the majority of countries where this applies, but it 
seems unlikely that this would be having a large effect on the variation 
across countries in wage inequality. What we know of the changes in 
incomes inequality since the beginning of the recession suggests that the 
differences across countries and country groups have been maintained 
or exacerbated. Between 2007 and 2011, household income inequal-
ity increased from its already relatively high level in England and the 
USA and in the CEE countries but declined in Nordic and East Asia n 
countries (OECD  2015 ). Social market and social democratic countries 
continue, on average, to have the lowest rates of income inequality in 
Europe, although income inequality has been rising in almost all coun-
tries. Changes in income inequality here, however, are not necessarily 
related to any recent changes in skills inequalities, which generally show 
a lagged relationship across countries to wage inequality (Bedard and 
Ferrall  2003 ). 
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  Conclusions 
 The analysis of cross- sectional time- series data on education system 
characteristics and outcomes can tell us a great deal about how the differ-
ent types of upper secondary provision affect youth transitions. As we argue 
above, there is substantial evidence that high participation in dual systems 
of apprenticeship helps to reduce inequalities in skills, as well as support-
ing smooth transitions to work and higher employment rates among young 
people. The relatively smooth transitions no doubt owe mostly to the basic 
property of apprenticeship systems, which is that they integrate young peo-
ple into the labor market from the outset, since that is the defi ning feature 
of the genuine apprenticeship system. However, the relative success of these 
systems in raising mean level of literacy and numeracy skills, and in reduc-
ing the proportions with very low levels of these skills, may also be a factor 
in ensuring that most young people still fi nd work. The Nordic and East 
Asia n countries have also been relatively good in maintaining employment 
rates among graduates and young people generally, including during the 
recession. In these cases, this is not achieved primarily through an early 
integration of education and work, since most of these countries do not 
have German- style occupational labor markets or developed apprentice-
ship training. What they do have, however, is quite standardized and broad- 
based long- cycle schooling at the upper secondary level, which appears 
effective in ensuring relatively high levels of literacy and numeracy skills for 
the vast majority of young people. This is likely to be an important factor 
in facilitating a smooth transition to work for the majority of young people. 
 By contrast, the mainly Anglophone countries , with highly diversifi ed, 
market- oriented provision in upper secondary education and training, 
and lacking mandatory study of Math and English at the upper second-
ary level, are less successful in achieving higher average levels of liter-
acy and numeracy , and less effective in mitigating literacy and numeracy 
skills inequality during the life course. The young people graduating 
from these systems are relatively polarized in terms of their command 
of some of the key skills required for entering and maintaining employ-
ment. Not surprisingly, those with the lowest skills, often from the voca-
tional tracks, experience much bumpier transitions to work than the 
most highly skilled , who usually come from the academic tracks. The lib-
eral systems have been relatively successful in raising participation rates 
in higher education, and this implied up until recently relatively good 
employment prospects for the growing proportion of young people who 
acquired degrees, who also benefi tted from relatively good wage returns 
from their qualifi cations. This situation, however, may well be changing, 
with rising unemployment and underemployment among graduates in 
some Anglophone countries . 
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 These broad cross- country patterns in the effects of upper secondary 
education and training do not appear to have been substantially dis-
rupted by the fi nancial crisis and ensuing recession, although they may 
be over the longer term. The strongly divergent pattern across countries 
in youth unemployment since the fi nancial crisis is most likely due to 
the substantial differences in the depth and longevity of the recession in 
different countries (Green, Mostafa, and Preston  2010 ). Upper second-
ary education and training systems that have been most effective in the 
past in facilitating young people’s transitions to work may have acted 
to mitigate the effects of adverse post- crisis labor market conditions in 
some countries. But it seems unlikely that the growing gulf between 
youth employment opportunities in northern and southern Europe , for 
instance, can be attributed primarily to differences in these systems. 
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